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Appellants, Lisa Hamilton Kunz, Stuart G. Hamiltonf
Vincent C, Hamiltonf Amber Hamilton McKelvey and Tonua Hamilton
(collectively the "Appellants") , pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of
Appellant Procedure, submit this Petition for Rehearing, and move
that the Court grant a rehearing on Appellee's Motion for Summary
Disposition.
STATEMENT OF DISPUTE POINTS OF LAW
AND/OR FACT
1.

Did the Court err as a matter of fact and law in

concluding that "cohabitation" consists of two elements, "residency

and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association/" given the
terminology found in the Antenuptial Agreement?
The qualifying phrase of "any other person" eliminates
any consideration of sexual contact. The Court's sole focus on the
term "cohabit" in effect rewrites the Antenuptial Agreement.

All

of the terms of the Antenuptial Agreement are not being harmonized
or given effect.

The only relevant Haddow element is common

residency.
2.

Did the Court err as a matter of fact and law in

finding and concluding that the disputed phrase of " . . . cohabit
therein with any other person" is unambiguous and therefore not
subject to further interpretation through extrinsic evidence?
The two terms of "cohabit" and "any other person" when
taken together create an ambiguity.

When an ambiguity exists,

extrinsic evidence as to the parties7 interest must be received and
considered; therefore, requiring the taking of evidence and the
making of factual findings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Gordon Dean Hamilton and Appellee Mary M. Hamilton

("Mary Hamilton") were married on September 26, 1986. Prior to the
marriage, the parties entered into an Antenuptial Agreement dated
September 26, 1986 (the "Antenuptial Agreement"). The Antenuptial
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Agreement was ratified by Gordon Dean Hamilton's Last Will and
Testament, dated December 7, 1989 (the "Will").
2.

Gordon Dean Hamilton died January 17, 1990.

Hamilton is not a devisee under the Will.

Mary

All of the residual

property was devised to Gordon Dean Hamilton's five children from
a previous marriage.

Gordon Dean Hamilton's five children from a

previous marriage constitute the Appellants in this case.
3.

The Antenuptial Agreement purports to grant a life

estate to Mary Hamilton in the residence and building lot of the
couple

M

...

so long as she does not cohabit therein with any

other person (emphasis added)." Gordon Dean Hamilton intended the
phrase "cohabit therein with any other person" to mean that Mary
Hamilton was not to have any person cohabit with her in the home.
4.

Mary Hamilton moved her daughter, son-in-law and

family into the house on or about December 1, 1991. According to
the terms of the Antenuptial Agreement, when Mary Hamilton's
daughterf

son-in-law

and

family moved

into

the

house, Mary

Hamilton's life estate terminated.
5.

Both the Appellants and the Appellees filed Motions

for Summary Judgment, the trial court considered the motions and
entered

a Memorandum

Decision on May

13, 1992 granting the

Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 8, 1992, the trial
court

entered

an

amended

Memorandum
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Decision

denying

the

Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment,

On August 6, 1992, the

trial court entered its Order Granting Summary Judgment which is
the judgment being appealed.
6.
on September

Appellees filed their Motion for Summary Disposition
25, 1992*

Appellants

filed their Response in

Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition on October
22, 1992. The Court of Appeals filed its Memorandum Decision (the
"Memorandum Decision") on November 30, 1992, which decision the
Appellants are petitioning for rehearing.
ARGUMENT I
THE QUALIFYING PHRASE OF "ANY OTHER PERSON"
ELIMINATES ANY CONSIDERATION OF SEXUAL
CONTACT; THEREFORE, THE ONLY RELEVANT
HADDOW ELEMENT IS COMMON RESIDENCY.
"[T]he term 'cohabitation' does not lend itself to a
universal definition that is applicable in all settings . . . [T]o
some extent, the meaning of the term depends upon the context in
which it is used."
1985).

The term

Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah
"cohabit" can have more than one meaning.

Webster's has two different definitions for the term "cohabit":
1.

To live together as husband and wife; and 2. To live together

(emphasis added). Webster's New World Dictionary 276 (1982). The
determination of whether a given set of circumstances constitutes
cohabitation requires the application of the terminology found in
a document to a given said of facts. Haddow, supra, at 671.
-4-

The Supreme Court in Haddow construed language which was
found in the parties' Divorce Decree which stated that the former
wife was to pay the former husband one-half of the equity in the
parties' home in which she was living if she moved out, remarried,
or "cohabited with a male person (emphasis added)."

In construing

the Divorce Decree in Haddow, the Supreme Court decided that there
are two key elements to be considered in determining whether
cohabitation

existed:

common

residency

evidencing a conjugal relationship.

and

sexual

contact

Haddow, supra. at 674 (which

this Court used in its Memorandum Decision) . The obvious thrust of
the terminology found in the Divorce Decree in Haddow was that a
sexual relation was part of the intended definition. However, the
set of facts and terminology found in this case are very different
than those found in Haddow.
The terminology used in the Antenuptial Agreement is that
Mary Hamilton's life estate shall be terminated if she " . . .
cohabit[s] therein with any other person (emphasis added)."

The

obvious thrust of the phrase "any other person" eliminates any
consideration of sexual contact. By eliminating any consideration
of sexual contact, the only relevant element to be considered under
the Haddow test is whether common residency exists.
The elimination of any consideration of sexual contact is
bolstered after an examination of the intent of the parties. The
-5-

meaning of the term "cohabitation" depends upon the context on
which it is used and that the intent of the parties should be
preserved. Haddow, supra, at 674. The cardinal rule in construing
a contract is to give effect to the intentions of the party, and if
possible, these intentions should be gleaned from an examination of
the text of the contract itself.

Buehner Block Co. v. U.W.C.

Assoc, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah App. 1989); G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis,
773 P.2d 841 (Utah 1989).
person" is very clear.

The qualifying language of "any other

"Any other person" is not limited to mean

only to live with a male person, an unrelated male or as husband
and wife.

"Any other person" means just that, that if Mary

Hamilton lives with any other person, then her life estate is
terminated.
The terminology in the Antenuptial Agreement, when read
together, comports with Webster's second definition of "cohabit"
(i.e. to live together).

The Court in its Memorandum Decision

states that "[i]f Mr. Hamilton had intended that Mary Hamilton's
life estate terminate under the circumstances of this case, he
could and should have used a term other than 'cohabit'. . . . "

By

simply focusing in on the term cohabit, the Court has completely
ignored the qualifying language of "any other person."

"A contract

should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its terms and
provisions, and all of its terms should be given effect if
-6-

possible."

G.G.A. Inc., supra, at 854

(citations omitted).

Therefore, by ignoring the qualifying language after cohabit, the
court has not interpreted the Antenuptial Agreement as to harmonize
all its terms and provisions and in essence has rewritten the
Agreement.

Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d

743 (Utah 1982) (A court will not rewrite a contract.).
The Supreme Court in Haddow defined common residency as
" . . . the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider
their principle domicile for more than a temporary or brief period
of time." Haddow, supra, at 672. The Supreme Court also discussed
common residency factors which aid in the determination of a
finding of common residency.

Haddow, supra, at 673.

The trial

court did not examine or make findings of fact and conclusions of
law whether common
existed.

residency

or factors of common

residency

The Appellees admit that the Fergusons have moved into

the home with Mary Hamilton.

That, in and of itself,

is

sufficient to terminate Mary Hamilton's life estate.
The
consideration

phrase
of

sexual

"any

other

contact

person"

eliminates

in determining

whether

any
Mary

Hamilton's life estate should be terminated. This Court's focus on
the term "cohabit" in effect rewrites the Antenuptial Agreement.
All of the terms of the Antenuptial Agreement are not being
harmonized or given effect.

The only relevant Haddow element is
-7-

common residency*

This Court's determination should be whether

Mary Hamilton's admission of moving her family into the home
constitutes common residency or whether the case should be remanded
to the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
whether common residency or factors of common residency existed.
ARGUMENT II
THE TERMINOLOGY FOUND IN THE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
CREATES AN AMBIGUITY; THEREFORE, EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE AS TO INTENT MUST BE RECEIVED AND
CONSIDERED, REQUIRING THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE AND THE
MAKING OF FACTUAL FINDINGS.
"A contract is considered ambiguous if 'the words used to
express the meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient
in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or more
plausible meanings'."

C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P.2d 923

(Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted). See also Saunders v. Sharp,
197 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (1992).

In this case, there are two terms

"cohabit" and "any other person."
may

be understood

The two terms taken together,

to reach two or more plausible meanings;

therefore, an ambiguity exists.
According to the trial court, the term cohabit means "to
live together as husband and wife."

According to this Court, the

term cohabit means "common residency and sexual contact evidencing
a conjugal association."

However, the second term, "any other

person," has not been defined by either court. If the ordinary and
-8-

usual meaning is attached to the second term, the qualifying
language of "any other person" is very clear.

The ordinary and

usual meaning of "any other person" is just that, any other person.
If the definition of "cohabit" is dependent upon the context in
which it is used, then no ambiguity exists, and any consideration
of sexual contact is eliminated.

(See Argument I, above.)

If the trial court's and this Court's definitions are
applied to the term "cohabit," then an ambiguity exists.

If the

Antenuptial Agreement is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence as to
the parties' intent must be received and considered in an effort to
glean what the parties actually agreed to.

This requires the

taking of evidence and the making of factual findings.
Realty, supra, at 929.

C.J.

See also John Call Engineering v« Manti

City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987) (The intentions of the
parties

to

a contract

are controlling,

and

generally

intentions will be found in the instrument itself.

those

However, if a

writing is not sufficient to establish meaning, resort may be had
to extraneous evidence manifesting the intentions of the parties.
Id. at 1207).
If a husband and wife relationship or sexual contact is
required, then an ambiguity exists. The two terms taken together
may

be understood

to reach two or more plausible meanings.

Extrinsic evidence as to the parties7 interest must be received and
-9-

considered, requiring the taking of evidence and the making of
factual findings.
CONCLUSION
The

term

cohabit

can

have more

than

one meaning;

therefore, the qualifying language is required to determine the
meaning and the intent of the parties.

The qualifying language

found in the Antenuptial Agreement of " . . . any other person" is
clear.

If the term "cohabit" is harmonized and given effect with

the qualifying language, then any consideration of sexual contact
is eliminated.

The only determination is whether common residency

existed when Mary Hamilton moved her family into the house. If the
Court attaches the sterile definition that the term cohabit means
"to live together as husband and wife" or that both prongs of the
Haddow test apply, than an ambiguity exists.

If an ambiguity

exists, then extrinsic evidence must be received and considered and
findings of fact are required to be taken. The undersigned counsel
hereby certifies in conformity with Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, that this Petition for Rehearing is made in
good faith and not for delay.

-10-

DATED this

z^

day of December, 1992T~~

y

JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & D\
}.l Corporate
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /T~

day of December, 1992,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR
REHEARING to be served by hand-delivery to:
Dallas H. Young, Jr
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University
Provo, Utah 84601

\SB\P\0227
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ADDENDUM

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Lisa Hamilton Kunz; Stuart G.
Hamilton; Vincent C. Hamilton;
Amber Hamilton McKelvey; and
Tonua Hamilton,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Case No, 920692-CA
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
F I L E D
(November 30, 1992)

v.
Mary M. Hamilton; Susan
Ferguson; and Andrew Ferguson,
Defendants and Appellees.

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Ray M. Harding
Attorneys:

N0V3 01382
Mary T Noonan
Clerk of the Court

,Ut*h C ' ^ °* Appeals
James R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Dallas H. Young, Provo, for Appellees

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Garff (Law & Motion).
PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on defendants' motion for
summary disposition. We summarily affirm.
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to terminate defendant
Mary Hamilton's life estate in real property devised to
plaintiffs by Gordon Hamilton. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants and plaintiffs appealed.
Plaintiffs contend that defendant Mary Hamilton's life
estate in the residence she shared with Gordon Hamilton prior to
his death terminated when she allowed her daughter and son-inlaw, the other defendants, to move into the residence with her.
Mary Hamilton's life estate in the property apparently derives
from two sources, an antenuptial agreement and Gordon Hamilton's
will. 1 The antenuptial agreement provides, with respect to the
subject residence, that "In the event, however, that Gordon
predeceases Mary, it is the intent of the parties that she be

1. Plaintiffs dispute that any devise was made to Mary Hamilton
by Gordon Hamilton's will. That dispute is the subject of a
separate appeal.

given a life
she does not
ratifies the
residence is
my wife Mary
remarries."

estate in the residence and building lot so long as
cohabit therein with any other person." The will
antenuptial agreement and further provides that the
bequeathed to plaintiffs "subject to a life estate
M. Hamilton who [sic] shall have unless she

Both sides rely exclusively on the antenuptial agreement
with respect to the existence of Mary Hamilton's life estate.
The antenuptial agreement is a contract and is construed
according to the general rules of contract construction.
Therefore, "we examine the language of the contract itself first,
*and unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is no
justification for attempting to vary it by extrinsic or parol
evidence.'" Stevenson v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 827 P.2d
973, 979 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Williams v. First Colony Life
Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979)). In this case,
plaintiffs argue that the phrase "cohabit therein with any other
person" is ambiguous, and seek to offer extrinsic evidence
regarding Gordon Hamilton/s intent with respect to that phrase.
Relying on Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), the
trial court found the disputed phrase to be unambiguous and
therefore not subject to further interpretation through parol
evidence. We agree. The Haddow court, while noting that the
term is generally defined as "[t]o live together as husband and
wife," held that "cohabitation" consists of two elements, "common
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association."
Id. at 671-72.
We note that the antenuptial agreement was prepared by an
attorney in 1986, after the Haddow case was issued. If Mr.
Hamilton had intended that Mary Hamilton's life estate terminate
under the circumstances of this case, he could and should have
used a term other than "cohabit," which has been defined by the
supreme court of this state to mean something other than that
asserted by plaintiffs to have been Gordon Hamilton's intent.2
We conclude that the contract is unambiguous and does not
terminate Mary Hamilton's life estate under the undisputed facts

2. The will, although not relied upon by the parties, also
appears to support the Haddow definition of cohabitation, by
specifying that the life estate created by the antenuptial
agreement continues "unless [Mary Hamilton] remarries."
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of this case. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in
defendants' favor is affirmed,.
*., *-»~ "*- # •*V- 'A**'

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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